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ABSTRACT
The 2007—2009 crisis was characterized by an unprecedented degree of international synchronization
as all major industrialized countries experienced large macroeconomic contractions around the date
of Lehman bankruptcy. At the same time countries also experienced large and synchronized tight-
ening of credit conditions. We present a two-country model with ﬁnancial market frictions where
a credit tightening can emerge as a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium caused by pessimistic but fully ratio-
nal expectations. As a result of the credit tightening, countries experience large and endogenously
synchronized declines in asset prices and economic activity (international recessions). The model
suggests that these recessions are more severe if they happen after a prolonged period of credit
expansion.
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One of the most striking features of the 2007-2009 recession is that in the midst of the crisis|
the quarter after the Lehman bankruptcy|all major industrialized countries experienced ex-
traordinarily large and synchronized contractions in real and nancial aggregates, including
aggregate measures of the growth rate of business credit.
These facts suggest that credit disturbances could have played a central role in the 2007-
2009 crisis. In this paper we show that these disturbances and many of the observed features of
the crisis can arise as the outcome of a self-fullling equilibrium characterized by global liquidity
shortage. We show this by developing a two-country incomplete-markets model where rms
use credit to nance hiring and to pay dividends. Credit is constrained by the option to default.
If rms are up against the constraint, equilibrium employment is aected by the shadow cost
of credit, which in turn depends upon the tightness of the credit constraint.
Our rst result shows that if the two countries are nancially integrated, the shadow cost
of credit is equalized across countries. Hence, an `exogenous' tightening of credit constraints
aects employment and economic activity in both countries, regardless of where the tightening
originates. This result suggests a transmission channel for credit shocks but does not deal with
the more fundamental question of what causes a credit shock.
Our second result provides an `endogenous' mechanism for credit tightening. More specif-
ically, we show that tighter/looser credit constraints can emerge endogenously as multiple
self-fullling equilibria. In `bad' equilibria, markets expect low resale prices for the assets of
defaulting rms. Because of this, rms face low credit capacity and are liquidity constrained.
This implies that the resale price of rms' assets is low since there are no rms that have the
ability to purchase the assets of liquidated rms. This rationalizes, ex-post, the ex-ante expec-
tation of low prices leading to bad equilibria. These equilibria are characterized by depressed
economic activity, nancial intermediation and asset prices. On the other hand, in `good'
equilibria, markets expect high resale prices of defaulting rms' assets, which allows for higher
debt. As a result of the high borrowing capacity, rms are unconstrained. This implies that
ex-post there are rms with the required liquidity to purchase the assets of liquidated rms,
which in turn keeps prices high. This rationalizes, ex-post, the ex-ante expectations of high
prices leading to equilibria with sustained levels of economic activity, nancial intermediation
and asset prices.
The dierence between exogenous and endogenous credit shocks does not only provide a
1more interesting theory of the recession, but it also explains one important feature of the crisis,
that is, the international co-movement in nancial intermediation. Although exogenous credit
shocks can generate co-movement in real economic activities, they do not generate co-movement
in nancial 
ows. Instead, endogenous credit shocks generate international co-movement in
both real and nancial 
ows. This is because endogenous credit shocks are determined by the
expected resale price of rms' assets. But in a nancially integrated economy, the expected
resale price is common across countries. Hence, credit contractions are also common across
countries and generate co-movement in all variables, real and nancial. Modeling the shocks
as endogenous processes has also important policy implications. It suggests that changes in
the structural features of the economy, such as nancial integration or the public provision of
liquidity, can change the volatility and international correlation of shocks, which usually are
taken as exogenous.
Our third result relates to the depth of the crisis. We show that `ordinary' credit shocks,
that is, shocks that would cause a mild contraction under normal circumstances, can indeed
generate `extra-ordinary' recessions if they arise after a long period of credit expansion. To
illustrate this result in the context of our model, we characterize an equilibrium path in which
credit constraints are not binding for a long period of time. During this period both economies
undergo a persistent expansion of economic activity (gradual) and of credit (rapid). However, if
constraints become binding after this long expansionary phase, rms are forced to implement a
large de-leveraging, which causes a sharp contraction in real economic activity and credit. This
happens even if agents fully anticipate the possibility of the reversal. This asymmetry between
the expansion phase and the contraction phase captures well the macroeconomic developments
of advanced economies during the recent cycle and during other episodes of nancial crises
(see, for example, Reinhart and Rogo (2009)).
One important observation concerning the international dimension of the recent crisis is
that, although real GDP experienced similar contractions in the US and in the rest of the
G7 countries, employment was hit particularly hard in the US but not in the remaining G7
countries (see Ohanian (2010)). As a consequence, labor productivity increased in the US but
declined in the rest of the G7 countries. Our baseline model with integrated credit markets and
symmetric labor markets does not capture this cross-country dierence. However, in the nal
section of the paper, we show that the heterogeneous response of employment is not necessarily
inconsistent with the idea of a credit shock once we allow for cross-country dierences in the
characteristics of national labor markets. We show this by introducing a stylized asymmetry
2in labor markets (more 
exibility in the US and less 
exibility in other G7 countries). With
this extension credit shocks have the potential to explain the similar cross-country responses
of GDP and nancial markets and the heterogeneous responses of employment, productivity
and the labor wedge.
We would like to stress that in this paper we do not claim that our theory is the only
possible theory that can explain the international recession evidence. Conceivably, one could
potentially develop other theories of common global shocks in which credit contraction is only
a consequence and not a cause of the crisis. We view the comparative evaluation of dierent
theories of global crises as an interesting direction for future research.
Our paper is related to the vast literature (both empirical and theoretical) studying the
sources of macroeconomic co-movement and international transmission of shocks. Usually co-
movement is explained as the result of synchronized disturbances (global or common shocks
as in Crucini, Kose and Otrok (2011)) and/or as the result of country-specic shocks that
spill over to other countries (international transmission of country-specic shocks). In this
paper we show that credit shocks generate co-movement for both reasons: exogenous credit
shocks spill over from one country to the other, and endogenous credit shocks will appear
to the econometrician like a common-shock or a global factor. This nding is consistent
with the empirical results of Helbling, Huidrom, Kose & Otrok (2011) in which credit market
shocks matter in explaining global business cycles, especially during the 2009 global recession.
Recent contributions that analyze directly the strong international co-movement during the
2007-2009 crisis include Dedola & Lombardo (2010), Devereux & Yetman (2010), Devereux
& Sutherland (2011), and Kollmann, Enders & M uller (2011). All of these studies focus on
the international transmission of shocks in models with nancial market frictions but do not
consider the possibility of endogenously generated credit contractions.
The role of credit shocks for macroeconomic 
uctuations has been recently investigated
primarily in closed economy models where the shocks follow purely exogenous processes.1 In
this paper, instead, we study the international implications of these shocks and provide a micro
foundation which is based on self-fullling expectations. Our theory is in line with the idea of
liquidity crises resulting from multiple equilibria outcomes as discussed in Lucas and Stokey
(2011) and it shares some similarities with the multiple equilibria property of models studied
in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) and Kocherlakota (2009). The idea that multiple equilibria can
1Examples are Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2009), Goldberg (2010), Jermann and Quadrini (2011), Khan and Thomas (2010) and Lorenzoni and Guerrieri
(2010).
3generate international co-movement has also been recently proposed by Bacchetta and van
Wincoop (2011).
Central to the multiplicity of equilibria in our model is the `occasionally binding' feature of
nancial constraints. This leads to another important dierence between our paper and other
studies that investigate the macroeconomic impact of nancial shocks. Most of these contri-
butions limit the analysis to equilibria with always binding constraints and the quantitative
properties are studied using linear approximation techniques. In our model, instead, borrow-
ing constraints are only occasionally binding and this is important to generate the asymmetry
between long and gradual credit driven booms and sharp credit driven recessions. Mendoza
(2010) also studies an economy with occasionally binding constraints but does not investigate
the importance of nancial shocks. Furthermore, Mendoza (2010) focuses on a small open
economy and thus the paper does not address the issue of international co-movement which
is central to our study. Occasionally binding constraints are also central to Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2010), but the analysis is limited to productivity shocks in a closed economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the macroeconomic and nancial
evidence about the recent crisis. We then present the theoretical framework gradually, starting
in Section 3 with a version of the model where capital is xed and credit shocks are exogenous.
Section 4 makes the credit shocks endogenous and describes the conditions for multiple equi-
libria. Section 5 adds capital accumulation and Section 6 presents the quantitative results. In
Section 7 we extend the model by allowing for cross-country heterogeneity in domestic labor
markets. Section 8 concludes.
2 Macroeconomic evidence
We rst present some facts about international co-movement during the 2007-2009 crisis and
then some evidence on the dynamics of credit and employment.
2.1 International co-movement
Figure 1 plots the GDP dynamics for the G7 countries during the six most recent US recessions.
In each panel we plot the percent deviations of GDP for each country from the level of GDP
in the quarter preceding the start of the US recession (based on the NBER business cycle
dating committee). Comparison of the bottom right panel of the gure with the other panels
suggests how the 2007-2009 period, and in particular the period following the Lehman crisis
4(marked by the vertical line), stands out both in terms of depth and in terms of macroeconomic
synchronization among the G7 countries. In none of the previous recessions GDP fell so much
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Figure 1: The dynamics of GDP during the six most recent recessions in the G7 countries.
Another way to illustrate the increased international co-movement associated with the
recent crisis is provided by Figure 2. This gure plots the average correlation of 10 years
rolling windows of quarterly GDP growth between all G7 countries. Two standard deviation
condence bands are also plotted. The dates in the graph correspond to the end points of
the window used to compute the correlation. We can see from the gure that during the
last two quarters of 2008 (the vertical line marks the third quarter), the average correlation
jumped from 0.3 to 0.7 and the sample standard deviation of the correlations fell from 0.19 to
0.09. This conrms that the 2007-2009 period stands out in the post-war era as a period of
























Figure 2: Rolling correlations of quarterly GDP growth among G7 countries.
The high degree of international co-movement between the US and other major industri-
alized countries is also observed in other real and nancial variables. Figure 3 plots GDP,
consumption, investment and employment in the period 2005-2010 for the US and an aggre-
gate of the other countries in the G7 group (from now on G6). The gure highlights that GDP,
consumption and investment were all hit hard in both the US and the G6 countries. This is
especially noticeable after the Lehman crisis, marked by the vertical line. Employment also
declined in the US and abroad, even though the US decline is much larger than the decline in
the G6, a feature emphasized by Ohanian (2010). We will return to this issue in the last part
of the paper where we will propose a possible explanation for the heterogeneous dynamics of
the labor market.
Figure 4 plots the dynamics of some nancial variables. The top left panel reports the
growth rate of stock prices for the US and for the G6 and it documents the massive and
synchronous decline in stock prices that took place during the crisis.2 The other panels plot
dierent measures of credit conditions in the business sector. The top right panel reports the
growth in total gross debt for the non-nancial businesses sector.3
2Stock prices for the US are the MSCI BARRA US stock market index, while stock prices in the G6 countries
are computed using the MSCI BARRA EAFE+Canada index which is an average of stock prices in advanced
economies except the US.
3The series for the US real debt is from the Flows of Funds Accounts and for the whole nonnancial business
sector. The series for the G6 is the sum of net debt (in constant PPP dollars) of the corporate non-nancial
sector for the Euro Area, Japan and Canada. Debt is dened as credit market instruments minus liquid assets,
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Note: Data for GDP, private consumtion, gross fixed capital formation are from OECD Quarterly National Accounts in PPP constant dollars.
Data for employment are from OECD Main Economic Indicators. All series are normalized to 1 in the fourth quarter of 2007.
Figure 3: GDP, Consumption, Investment and Employment in US and G6: 2005-2010
Indicators of credit market conditions based on credit volumes have been criticized as they
do not take into account that a credit crunch might induce rms to draw on existing credit
lines, so the distress does not immediately show up in quantities. See, for example, Gao and
Yun (2009). For this reason the bottom left panel reports a dierent indicator of credit market
conditions. The indicator is not based on volumes of credit but on opinion surveys of senior
loan ocers of banks. The plotted index is the percentage of banks that relaxed the standards
to approve commercial and industrial loans minus the percentage of banks that tightened the
standards. Thus, a negative number represents an overall tightening of credit.4
As can be seen from the third panel of Figure 4, the index shows a credit tightening that
starts before the decline in credit growth. To take both types of evidence into account, the
securities RPs, commercial paper, treasury securities, agency and GSE backed securities, municipal securities
and mutual fund shares.
4The series for the US is released by the Federal Reserve Board (Senior Loan Ocers Opinions Survey).
The series for the G6 is based on similar surveys released by the European Central Bank (ECB Bank Lending
Survey), Bank of Japan (Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey) and Bank of Canada (Senior Loan Ocers
Opinions Survey). The index for the G6 is a weighted average of the indexes in the three areas with weights
proportional to the size of their debt. The indices are typically reported with the inverted sign (tightening credit
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Figure 4: GDP, Stock markets and credit conditions in US and G6: 2005-2010
bottom right panel constructs a credit index that is a simple average of the two previous
measures, where each series is normalized by its own standard deviation.
The key lesson we learn from Figure 4 is that, right around 2008, credit conditions moved
from strongly loose/expansionary to strongly tight/contractionary both in the US and in the
other G7 countries. This evidence will be particularly important in the second part of the
paper as it allows us to identify more precisely the nature of the crisis.
2.2 Domestic co-movement between credit and employment
As discussed in the introduction, our main hypothesis is that tight credit aects economic
activity and especially employment. Here we provide some empirical support for this idea by
plotting the growth rates of employment, GDP and business credit during the crisis in the US
and in the G6. Figure 5 shows that in the quarters following the Lehman crisis (indicated by
the vertical line), both credit and employment slow-down signicantly in the US and in the
G6. Interestingly, GDP also declines initially but recovers more quickly than employment and
credit. For example, in the rst quarter of 2009, credit and employment are still depressed
8(experiencing negative growth) in the US and in the G6. However, GDP has already recovered
(experiencing positive growth) in both countries. We view this evidence as consistent with our
basic hypothesis: tight credit reduces employment and as employment falls labor productivity
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Figure 5: Domestic co-movement of credit, employment and GDP: 2005-2010
A nal observation relates to the asymmetry between real and nancial variables in the
expansion phase before the crisis and the collapse during the crisis. Figure 5 shows that debt
experienced rapid growth (about 6% per year in the US and 4% per year in the G6) in the
years preceding the crisis, while the growth in real variables has been moderate (GDP grew
about 2% per year both in US and the G6). In the crisis period, instead, all variables, real
and nancial, contracted sharply. This feature is not unique to the 2007-2009 crisis. Several
authors have observed that many historical episodes of credit booms are not associated with
much faster growth in real economic activity. However, when the credit booms reach a sudden
stop, their reversals are often associated with sharp macroeconomic contractions. See, for
example, Reinhart and Rogo (2009), Classens, Kose and Terrones (2011), Jord a, Schularick,
and Taylor (2011) and Schularick and Taylor (2011).
The facts presented in this section|high international co-movement in real and nancial
variables during the crisis, the large employment (for the US) and stock markets collapse, and
the asymmetry between the pre-crisis phase and post-crisis phase|cannot be easily explained
with a standard workhorse international business cycle model (see, for example, Heathcote and
Perri (2004)). In the next sections we propose a theoretical framework with credit disturbances
9that helps us understand these facts.
3 The model with xed capital and exogenous credit shocks
We start with a simple model without capital accumulation and with exogenous credit shocks.
This allows us to provide analytical intuitions for some of the key results of the paper. After
the presentation of the simple model we will add capital accumulation and solve the model
numerically.
There are two types of atomistic agents, investors and workers. A key dierence between
these two types of agents is the availability of dierent investment opportunities. Due to the
assumption of market segmentation only investors have access to the ownership of rms while
workers can only save in the form of bonds. A second dierence is in the discount factor.
Investors discount the future by  while the discount factor of workers is  > . As we will
see, the higher discounting of investors implies that in equilibrium rms borrow from workers.
To facilitate the presentation we rst describe the closed-economy version of the model.
Once we have characterized the autarkic equilibrium, it will be easy to extend it to the envi-
ronment with two countries and international mobility of capital.
3.1 Investors and rms
Investors have lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 tu(ct). They are the owners of rms and can trade
shares with other investors. Since investors are homogeneous and they earn only capital in-
comes from the ownership of rms' shares, in equilibrium their consumption is equal to the
dividends paid by rms. Denoting by dt the dividends, the eective discount factor for in-
vestors is mt+1 = uc(dt+1)=uc(dt). This is also the discount factor for rms since they
maximize shareholders' wealth. As we will see, 
uctuations in the eective discount factor
play a central role in the analysis of this paper.
Before proceeding we would like to clarify that the assumption that investors only hold
rms' shares and they cannot borrow or save in the form of bonds is without loss of generality.
Borrowing and/or savings will be done on their behalf by rms, as we will describe shortly.
Firms operate the production function F(ht) =  kh
t, where  k is a xed input of capital and
ht is the variable input of labor. The parameter  is smaller than 1 implying decreasing returns
to scale in the variable input. In this version of the model without capital accumulation we
can think of  k as a normalizing constant.
10Firms start the period with intertemporal debt bt. Before producing they choose the labor
input ht, the dividends dt, and the next period debt bt+1. The budget constraint is




where Rt is the gross interest rate.
The payments of wages, wtht, dividends, dt, and current debt net of the new issue, bt  
bt+1=Rt, are made before the realization of revenues. This implies that the rm faces a cash

ow mismatch during the period. The cash needed at the beginning of the period is wtht +
dt + bt   bt+1=Rt. To cover the cash 
ow mismatch, the rm contracts the intra-period loan
lt = wtht + dt + bt   bt+1=Rt which is repaid at the end of the period, after the realization of
revenues. From the budget constraint (1) we can also see that the intra-period loan lt is equal
to the revenue F(ht).
Debt contracts are not perfectly enforceable as the rm can default. Default takes place
at the end of the period before repaying the intra-period loan. At this stage the rm holds
the revenue F(ht) which is equal to the intra-period loan lt. The revenue represents liquid
funds that can be easily diverted in the event of default. Default gives the lender the right to
liquidate the rm's assets. But after the diversion of lt = F(ht), the only remaining asset is the
physical capital  k. Suppose that the liquidation value of capital is t k, where t is stochastic.
Since default arises at the end of the period, the total liabilities of the rm are lt + bt+1=Rt.
To ensure that the rm does not default, the total liabilities are subject to the enforcement
constraint




A formal derivation of this constraint is provided in Appendix A and it is based on similar
assumptions as in Hart and Moore (1994).
Fluctuations in t aect the ability to borrow and, as we will see, they generate pro-cyclical
movements in real and nancial variables.5 Our goal is to derive the variable t endogenously
from liquidity considerations. As we will describe below, 
uctuations in this variable are
induced by self-fullling expectations leading to multiple equilibria. For the moment, however,
we treat t as an exogenous stochastic variable. Once we have characterized the equilibrium
with an exogenous t, we will make it endogenous in Section 4.
5Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) provide some evidence that the liquidity of capital t must be procyclical to
match the amount of capital reallocation observed in the data.
11To illustrate the role played by 
uctuations in t, consider a pre-shock equilibrium in which
the enforcement constraint is binding. Starting from this equilibrium, suppose that t decreases.
In response to the decline in t the rm is forced to reduce either the dividends and/or the
input of labor. To see this, let's start with the case in which the rm is unwilling to change the
input of labor ht. This implies that the intra-period loan lt = wtht +dt +bt  bt+1=Rt = F(ht)
also does not change. Thus, the only way to satisfy the enforcement constraint, Equation
(2), is by reducing the intertemporal debt bt+1. We can then see from the budget constraint,
Equation (1), that the reduction in bt+1 requires a reduction in dividends. Thus, the rm is
forced to substitute debt with equities.
Alternatively the rm could keep the dividend payments unchanged and reduce the intra-
period loan lt = F(ht). This would also ensure that the enforcement constraint is satised but
it requires the reduction in the input of labor. Therefore, after a reduction in t, the rm faces
a trade-o: paying lower dividends or cutting employment. The optimal choice depends on the
relative cost of changing these two margins which, as we will see, depends on the stochastic
discount factor for investors mt+1 = uc(dt+1)=uc(dt).
Firm's problem: The optimization problem of the rm can be written recursively as
V (s;b) = max
d;h;b0
(












where s are the aggregate states, including the shock , and the prime denotes the next period
variable. The enforcement constraint takes into account that the intra-period loan is equal to
the rm's output, that is, lt = wtht + dt + bt   bt+1=Rt = F(ht).





REm0 = 1   ; (7)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the enforcement constraint. These conditions are derived
under the assumption that dividends are always positive, which will be the case if the investors'
utility satises uc(0) = 1. The detailed derivation is in Appendix B.
We can see from condition (6) that there is a wedge in the demand for labor if the enforce-
ment constraint is binding ( > 0). This derives from the fact that the input of labor needs
to be nanced and part of the nancing has to come from equity (through lower payment of
dividends). As long as the cost of equity, 1=Em0, is greater than the cost of debt, R, expanding
the input of labor is costly in the margin because the rm needs to substitute debt with equity.
It is then the equity premium 1=Em0 R that determines the labor wedge as can be seen from
condition (7).6 The wedge is strictly increasing in  and disappears when  = 0, that is, when
the enforcement constraint is not binding.
Some partial equilibrium properties: The characterization of the rm's problem in par-
tial equilibrium provides helpful insights about the property of the model once extended to a
general equilibrium set-up. For partial equilibrium we mean the allocation achieved when the
interest rate and the wage rate are both exogenously given and constant.
Under these conditions, Equation (7) shows that  decreases with the expected discount
factor Em0. A decrease in  makes the enforcement constraint tighter. Because rms reduce
the payment of dividends, investors' consumption has to decrease. This induces a decline in the
discount factor m0 = uc(d0)=uc(d) and an increase in the multiplier  according to condition
(7). From condition (6) we can then see that the demand for labor declines.
Intuitively, when the credit conditions become tighter, rms need to rely more on equity
nancing and less on debt. This requires investors to cut consumption (dividends) which is
costly since they have concave utility. Because of this, in the short-term rms do not raise
enough equity needed to keep the pre-shock production scale and cut employment. If investors'
6Notice that we are using the term `equity premium' to denote the dierential between the expected share-
holders' return and the interest rate on bonds. Since shareholders and bondholders are dierent agents, the
equity premium is not only determined by the cost of risk (risk premium).
13utility were linear (risk-neutrality), the discount factor would be equal to Em0 =  and the
credit shock would not aect employment. This also requires that the interest rate does not
change, which is the case in the partial equilibrium considered here. In the general equilibrium,
of course, prices do change. In particular, movements in the demand of credit and labor aect
the interest rate R and the wage rate w. To derive the aggregate eects we need to close the
model and characterize the general equilibrium.
3.2 Closing the model and general equilibrium
There is a representative household/worker with lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 tU(ct;ht), where ct
is consumption, ht is labor and  is the intertemporal discount factor. It will be convenient to
assume that the period-utility takes the form








The worker's budget constraint is wtht + bt = ct +
bt+1
Rt , and the rst order conditions for











We can now dene a competitive general equilibrium. The aggregate states, denoted by s,
are given by the credit conditions  and the aggregate stock of bonds B.
Denition 3.1 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilibrium is dened by a
set of functions for (i) workers' policies hw(s), cw(s), bw(s); (ii) rms' policies h(s;b), d(s;b),
b(s;b); (iii) rms' value V (s;b); (iv) aggregate prices w(s), R(s), m(s0); (v) law of motion
for the aggregate states s0 = 	(s); such that: (i) household's policies satisfy the optimality
conditions (8)-(9); (ii) rms' policies are optimal and V (s;b) satises the Bellman's equation
(3); (iii) the wage and interest rates are the clearing prices in the markets for labor and bonds,
and the discount factor for rms is m(s0) = uc(dt+1)=uc(dt); (iv) the law of motion 	(s) is
consistent with the aggregation of individual decisions and the stochastic processes for z and .
14To illustrate the main properties of the model we look at some special cases. Consider
rst the economy without uncertainty, that is,  is constant. In this economy the enforcement
constraint binds in a steady state equilibrium. To see this, consider the rst order condition
for the bond, Equation (9), which in a steady state becomes R = 1. Using this condition
to eliminate R in (7) and taking into account that in a steady state Em0 = , we get  =
1   = > 0 (since  > ). Firms want to borrow as much as possible because the cost of
borrowing|the interest rate|is smaller than their discount rate.
With uncertainty, however, the enforcement constraint may be binding only occasionally,
in particular, after a large and unexpected decline in . In this case rms will be forced to
cut dividends inducing a change in the discount factor Em0. Furthermore, the change in the
demand for credit has an impact on the equilibrium interest rate. Using condition (7) we can
see that these changes aect the multiplier , which in turn has an impact on the demand
for labor (see Equation (6)). On the other hand, an increase in  may leave the enforcement
constraint non-binding without direct eects on the demand of labor. Therefore, the responses
to credit shocks could be highly asymmetric: negative shocks induce large falls in employment
and output while the impacts of positive shocks is moderate.
3.3 Capital mobility
Let's consider now two countries, domestic and foreign, with the same size, preferences and
technology as described in the previous section. Although we consider the case with only
two symmetric countries, the model can be easily extended to any number of countries and
with dierent degrees of heterogeneity. For the moment we continue to assume that t is an
`exogenous' stochastic variable, specic to each country.
Once we allow for cross-country capital mobility, we have to specify what agents can do in
an integrated nancial market. We continue to assume that there is market segmentation in
the ownership of rms, that is, workers are unable to purchase shares of rms. However, in
addition to domestic bonds they can purchase foreign bonds. Furthermore, investors are now
able to purchase shares of foreign rms.
Investors/rms: Because rms are subject to country specic shocks, investors would gain
from diversifying the cross-country ownership of shares. Therefore, in an economy that is
nancially integrated, investors choose to own the worldwide portfolio of shares and we have
15a representative `worldwide' investor.7 Because domestic and foreign rms are owned by the
same representative shareholder, they will use the same discount factor mt+1 = uc(dt+1 +
d
t+1)=uc(dt+d
t), where investors' consumption is the sum of dividends paid by domestic rms,
dt, plus the dividends paid by foreign rms, d
t. From now on we will use the star superscript
to denote variables pertaining to the foreign country.
Besides the common discount factor, rms continue to solve problem (3) and the rst order
conditions are given by Equations (6) and (7). Let's focus on condition (7), which we rewrite
here for both countries,
RtEmt+1 = 1   t;
R
tEm
t+1 = 1   
t:
Since the discount factor is common to domestic and foreign rms, that is, Emt+1 = Em
t+1,
and the interest rate is equalized across countries, Rt = R
t, the above conditions imply that
the lagrange multipliers will also be equalized, that is, t = 
t. Therefore, independently of
which country is hit by a shock, if the enforcement constraint is binding for domestic rms,
it will also be binding for foreign rms. This also implies that the labor wedges in the two
countries are equal. In fact, condition (6) is still the optimality condition for the choice of
















This property is crucial for understanding the cross-country impact of a nancial shock as we
will describe below. Later we will also consider an extension of the model where the labor
wedge may respond dierently in the two countries.
Households/workers: Although workers are still prevented from accessing the market for
the ownership of rms, with capital mobility they can engage in international nancial trans-
actions with foreign workers. More specically, domestic workers can trade state-contingent
claims with foreign workers, in addition to holding bonds issued by rms. However, we continue
7A perfect diversication of portfolios is optimal because investors' utility depends only on consumption. If
investors derived utility also from leisure, a perfect diversication would not be necessarily optimal.
16to assume that rms cannot trade state contingent claims with workers, that is, the repayment
of bonds must be unconditional. The unavailability of state-contingent claims between rms
and workers is essential to retain market incompleteness.
Denote by nt+1(st+1) the units of consumption goods received at time t + 1 by domestic
workers if the aggregate states are st+1. These are worldwide states, and therefore, they include
the aggregate states of both countries as will be made precise below. Of course, in equilibrium,
the consumption units received by workers in the domestic country must be equal to the
consumption units paid by workers in the foreign country, that is, nt+1(st+1)+n
t+1(st+1) = 0.
This must be satised for all possible realizations of the aggregate states st+1.
The budget constraint of a worker in the domestic country is







where qt(st+1)=Rt is the unit price of the contingent claims.
Given the specication of the utility function, the rst order conditions for the choice of
















p(st+1) = q(st+1); for all st+1; (12)
where p(st+1) is the probability (or probability density) of the aggregate states in the next
period for the world economy.
Since in equilibrium the prices and probabilities of the contingencies are the same for









Therefore, the ratio of consumption of domestic and foreign workers remains constant over
time. We denote this constant ratio by . This is a well known property in environments with
a full set of state-contingent claims. In our environment the constancy of the consumption
17ratio is among workers (and among investors) but not between workers and investors because
of the assumption of market segmentation.
Before continuing we would like to clarify that the assumption of contingent claims among
workers is not essential for the results of the paper. We could simply assume that workers
can engage in international non-contingent lending and borrowing. However, the availability
of contingent claims greatly simplies the characterization of the equilibrium because it allows
us to reduce the number of `sucient' state variables. This property will be convenient once
we extend the model with capital accumulation.
Aggregate states and equilibrium: We can now dene the equilibrium for the open-
economy version of the economy. The aggregate states s are given by the variables  and ,
the nancial liabilities of rms, Bt and B
t , and the net foreign asset position of the domestic
country, Nt. Since in equilibrium the net foreign asset position of the domestic country is the
negative of the foreign position, once we know Bt, B
t and Nt we also know the total wealth of
domestic workers, Bt + Nt, and foreign workers, B
t   Nt. Therefore, st = (;;Bt;B
t ;Nt).
Denition 3.2 (Recursive equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilibrium is dened by a





w(s;s0); (ii) rms' policies h(s;b), d(s;b), b(s;b), h(s;b), d(s;b), b(s;b); (iii) rms' values
V (s;b) and V (s;b); (iv) aggregate prices w(s), w(s), R(s), m(s;s0), q(s;s0); (v) law of motion
for the aggregate states s0 = 	(s); such that: (i) household's policies satisfy the optimality
conditions (8)-(12); (ii) rms' policies are optimal and satisfy the Bellman's equation (3)
for both countries; (iii) the wages clear the labor markets; the interest rates and the price
for contingent claims clear the worldwide nancial markets; the discount rate used by rms
satises m(s;s0) = uc(dt+1 +d
t+1)=uc(dt +d
t); (iv) the law of motion 	(s) is consistent with
the aggregation of individual decisions and the stochastic process for  and .
The only dierence with respect to the equilibrium in the closed economy is that there
is the additional market for foreign claims and the discount factor for rms is given by the
worldwide representative investor. The market clearing condition for the foreign claims is
N(s0) + N(s0) = 0. This is in addition to the clearing conditions for the domestic bond
markets (lending to rms).
Although the general denition of the recursive equilibrium is based on the set of state
variables st = (t;
t;Bt;B
t ;Nt), we can use some of the properties derived above and charac-
18terize the equilibrium with a smaller set of states. Let Wt = Bt +B
t be the worldwide wealth
of households/workers. This is the sum of bonds issued by domestic rms, Bt, and foreign
rms, B
t . Then using the fact that the consumption ratio of domestic and foreign workers is
constant at  and the employment policy of rms does not depend on the individual debt, the
recursive equilibrium can be characterized by the state vector st = (t;
t ;Wt). The assump-
tion of cross-country risk-sharing among workers and investors (but not between workers and
investors) allows us to reduce the number of `endogenous' states to only one variable.
Intuitively, by knowing Wt, we know the worldwide liability of rms, but not the distribu-
tion between domestic and foreign rms. However, to characterize the rms' policies, we only
need to know the worldwide debt, which is equal to Wt. Since investors own an internationally
diversied portfolio of shares, eectively there is only one representative global investor. It is
as if there is a representative rm with two productive units: one unit located in the domes-
tic country and the other in the foreign country. Since both units have a common owner, it
does not matter how the debt is distributed between the two units. What matters from the
perspective of the investor is the total debt and the total payment of dividends.8
Total workers' wealth is also a sucient statistic for the characterization of the workers'
policies since the consumption ratio between domestic and foreign households remains constant
at . This property limits the computational complexity of the model, making the use of non-
linear approximation methods practical. We will come back to this point after the description
of the general model with capital accumulation.
We are now ready to state the following proposition about the impact of a nancial shock.
Proposition 3.1 An unexpected change in t (domestic credit shock) has the same impact on
employment and output of domestic and foreign countries.
Proof 3.1 We have already shown that the Lagrange multiplier t is common for domestic
and foreign rms. If the wage ratio in the two countries does not change, the rst order
conditions imply that all rms choose the same employment. To complete the proof we have
to show that the cross-country wage ratio stays constant. Because rms in both countries have
the same demand for labor and the ratio of workers' consumption remains constant, the rst
8This is similar to the problem solved by a multinational rms that faces demand uncertainty in dierent
countries as studied in Goldberg and Kolstad (1995). There is also some similarity with the problem faced by
multinational banks that own subsidiaries in dierent countries. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) provide evidence
that multinational banks do reallocate nancial resources internally in response to country specic shocks.
19order condition for the supply of labor from workers (Equation (10)) implies that the wage
ratio between the two countries does not change.
Therefore, independently of whether a credit shock hits the domestic or foreign markets,
both countries experience the same macroeconomic consequences.
Although exogenous credit shocks can explain co-movement in GDP and other real vari-
ables, there are two problems with this approach. The rst is that treating shocks as exogenous
does not help us understand the causes of these shocks and the desirability of policy interven-
tions. The second and more specic problem is that it also induces nancial 
ows that tend
to move in opposite directions. To show this, consider an initial equilibrium in which the
enforcement constraints are not binding in either countries. Starting from this equilibrium
suppose that the domestic economy is hit by a credit contraction (reduction in t but not in

t) inducing binding enforcement constraints in both countries. Since t is lower only in the
domestic country, the outstanding debt of domestic rms contracts but the debt of foreign
rms increases. Foreign rms increase their debt to pay more dividends to shareholders in
order to compensate the reduction in dividends paid by domestic rms. Therefore, the model
with `exogenous' credit shocks generates negative cross-country co-movement in debt.
This feature of the model is inconsistent with Figure 4 showing a high degree of cross-
country co-movement in credit variables. However, as we will see in the next section, once we
make 
uctuations in t and 
t endogenous, the model also generates positive co-movement in
nancial 
ows, introducing a second source of real macroeconomic synchronization.
4 Endogenous credit shocks
After illustrating how a credit shock propagates to the real sector of the economy, we now
provide a micro foundation for endogenous 
uctuations in t. We proceed rst with the closed-
economy model and then we extend it to a two-country set-up.
Financial autarky: Suppose that in case of liquidation, physical capital  k can be sold to
either households or rms. In the rst case one unit of capital is transformed in  units of
consumption. Alternatively, the capital can be sold to other rms for productive uses. In this
case one unit of capital can be transformed in  units of reinstalled capital. The reallocation in
other rms is more ecient than its transformation in consumption goods, that is,  <   1.
However, in order for non-defaulting rms to purchase additional capital, they need liquid
20funds. In this sense our model shares some features of the model studied in Kiyotaki and
Moore (2008).
Since all rms face the enforcement constraint




a non-defaulting rm can purchase additional capital only if the rm has previously chosen not
to borrow up to the limit, that is, constraint (14) is not binding. Therefore, if at the beginning
of the period rms choose not to borrow up to the limit, ex-post there will be rms that have
the ability to purchase the capital of a defaulting rm (since they have unused credit). In
this case the market price of liquidated capital is . On the other hand, if at the beginning of
the period all rms choose to borrow up to the limit, ex-post there will not be any rm with
liquidity (unused credit). Then the capital of a defaulting rm can only be sold to households
and the price is .
Since the value of liquidated capital depends on the nancial choices of rms, which in turn
depends on the expected liquidation value, the model could generate multiple self-fullling
equilibria.
Suppose that the expected liquidation price is t = . The low price makes the enforcement
constraint (14) tighter, which may induce rms to borrow up to the limit in order to contain
the cut in dividends and/or employment. Then, if all rms borrow up to the limit, there will
not be any rm, ex-post, that has liquidity to purchase the capital of a defaulting rm. Thus,
the ex-post liquidation price is , fullling the market expectation.
Now suppose that the expected liquidation price is . Because the enforcement constraint
(14) is not tight in the current period but could become tighter in the future, rms may choose
not to borrow up to the limit. But then, in case of liquidation, there will be rms capable of
purchasing the liquidated capital and the market price is . So also in this case we have that
the ex-ante expectation of a high liquidation price is fullled by the rms' borrowing choice.
Whether the two equilibria described above are possible depends on the particular states
of the economy. Three cases are possible, depending on the state of the economy:
1. The liquidation price is  with probability 1. This arises if we are in a state in which
rms choose to borrow up to the limit independently of the expectation over t.
2. The liquidation price is  with probability 1. This arises if we are in a state in which
rms do not borrow up to the limit independently of the expectation over t.
213. The liquidation price is  with some probability p 2 (0;1). This can arise if we are in
a state in which rms choose to borrow up to the limit when the expectation for the
liquidation value is t =  but they do not borrow up to the limit when the expectation
for the liquidation price is t = .
The third case is the most interesting because it allows for multiple sunspot equilibria, and
therefore, potential 
uctuations in t. In this case the low liquidation price  could arise with
any probability p. In general we can denote by pt(st) the probability of t = . Besides the
fact that the probability distribution of t could be time variant, the properties of the model
characterized in the previous sections do not change.
Financial integration: As in the closed economy, dierent values of t are associated to
self-fullling expectations. If countries are in nancial autarky, t could be dierent from 
t.
However, once the two countries become nancially integrated, t cannot be dierent from 
t.
As we have seen in the previous section, if the enforcement constraint is binding in one
country, it must also be binding in the other country, that is, t = 
t > 0. This eliminates
equilibria where t =  and 
t = . We state this property formally in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1 In equilibria with integrated nancial markets, t is always equal to 
t
Proof 4.1 Suppose that the equilibrium is characterized by t =  and 
t = . In order
to have t =  we need that t > 0 and to have 
t =  we need that 
t = 0. But in an
equilibrium with integrated nancial markets, t is always equal to 
t. Therefore, this cannot
be an equilibrium. Using the same argument we can exclude the possibility of an equilibrium
with t =  and 
t = . The only possible equilibria are those with t = 
t.
Therefore, nancial integration implies perfect cross-country co-movement in t, which
introduces a second channel of real macroeconomic synchronization: not only a change in one
country  aects the real sector of the other country but movements in  become perfectly
correlated across countries. This also implies international co-movement in nancial 
ows.
This is a key theoretical result of this paper and suggests that the Lehman default could be
interpreted as the trigger that switched the world economy from an equilibrium with globally
loose credit to an equilibrium with tight credit and shortage of liquidity, causing widespread
contraction in economic and nancial activities.
22Also in the case of nancial integration the probability of t =  can be expressed as a
function of the aggregate states, that is, p(st). Now, however, one of the two equilibria can
be induced by changes in expectations in one of the two countries. For simplicity suppose
that in states with multiple equilibria the domestic country expects t =  with probability
p. The same for the foreign country. Based on this assumption we have that p(st) can take
three values, that is, p(st) 2
n
0 ; 2 p(1    p) +  p2 ;  p2 ; 1
o
. The probability is zero when rms
choose not to borrow up to the limit (t = 
t = 0) even if the expectation is t = 
t = .
The probability is 2 p(1   p)+  p2 if rms choose to borrow up to the limit (t = 
t > 0) when
either t or 
t are equal to . The probability is  p2 if rms choose to borrow up to the limit
(t = 
t > 0) only if both t and 
t are equal to . Finally, the probability is 1 if rms choose
to borrow up to the limit (t = 
t > 0) independently of the values of t and 
t.
The general denition of equilibrium is analogous to the denition provided for the model
with exogenous t. We simply need to add the probability function p(st) which must be
consistent with the optimal decisions of rms as described here.
5 Model with capital accumulation
We now relax the assumption that the input of capital is xed. This introduces additional
state variables that increase the computational complexity of the model. Since the enforce-
ment constraint is only occasionally binding, we need to use global approximation techniques.
Unfortunately, these techniques are computationally intensive and become quickly impractical
when we have a large number of state variables. Therefore, in order to reduce the sucient
set of state variables, we will make some special assumptions about the production technology,
which takes the form




where Kt is the `aggregate' capital in the domestic country and K
t in the foreign country, kt
is the `individual' input of capital and ht is the `individual' input of labor. We assume that
 +  < 1.
The dependence of the production function from the worldwide stock of capital, Kt + K
t ,
introduces positive externalities. The purpose of the externalities is to have constant returns
in reproducible factors (AK technology), maintaining the competitive structure of the model,
that is, each producer runs a production technology with non-increasing returns. As we will
see, the AK structure simplies the computation of the equilibrium and this is the only reason
23we make this assumption.
Given it the 
ow of investment, the stock of capital evolves according to






where  is the depreciation rate and the function (:) is strictly increasing and concave, cap-
turing adjustment costs in investment. The assumption of capital adjustment costs is common
in international macro models and it is made to prevent excessive volatility of investments.
The budget constraint of the rm is
bt + dt + it = (Kt + K
t )1 k
th




and the enforcement constraint







We will now take advantage of the AK structure and normalize the model by the worldwide
stock of capital Kt + K
t . Using the tilde sign to denote normalized variables, we can rewrite
the budget constraint, the law of motion for capital and the enforcement constraint as
~ bt + ~ dt +~ it = ~ k
th















The variable gt = (Kt+1 + K
t+1)=(Kt + K
t ) is the gross growth rate of worldwide capital
and ~ kt = kt=(Kt+K
t ) the normalized individual capital. We will denote by st = Kt=(Kt+K
t )
the aggregate share of capital owned by domestic rms. Since in equilibrium kt = Kt, we also
have that ~ kt = st.
As in the model without capital accumulation, investors hold an internationally diversied
portfolio of shares, and rms use the common discount factor mt+1 = [(dt+1 + d
t+1)=(dt +
24d




~ dt+1 + ~ d
t+1





The optimization problem solved by an individual rm can be rewritten as
~ V (~ s;~ k;~ b) = max
~ d;~ h;~ i;~ b0
(
~ d + g1 E ~ m0~ V (~ s0;~ k0;~ b0)
)
(18)
subject to (15), (16);(17);
where ~ V is the rm's value normalized by aggregate worldwide capital K +K, and ~ s denotes
the normalized aggregate states as specied below.
We can now see the analytical convenience of having the capital externality. Thanks to the
AK structure, we can write the rm's value function as Vt = (Kt + K
t )  ~ Vt and rescale the
problem of the rm by worldwide capital. By doing so, we do not need to keep track of the
aggregate stock of capital as a state variable. Of course, because we are looking at a general
equilibrium, we also need to make sure that the supply of labor does not grow over time. This
will be the case with the workers' utility function specied earlier.
Appendix C derives the rst order conditions for the rm. After imposing the equilibrium
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Here t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the enforcement constraint and Qt is
25the Lagrange multiplier associated with the law of motion for the stock of capital (Tobin's q).
We can verify that the stock of capital does not enter these equations, which validates the
conjecture that the optimal policies are independent of the stock of capital.
Notice that the property that the Lagrange multipliers and the labor wedge 1=(1 t) are
equalized across countries also applies to this extended model. In fact, from condition (20)
we can see that the common discount factor and the equalization of the interest rates across
countries imply t = 
t. Therefore, if the enforcement constraint is binding in one country, it
must also be binding in the other.
Aggregate states and equilibrium: Denote by ~ Wt = ~ Btst + ~ B
t (1   st) the normalized
worldwide wealth of households/workers. Thanks to the AK technology and the normalization
described above, we only need to keep track of two `endogenous' state variables: ~ Wt and
st. Therefore, compared to the simpler model considered earlier, the introduction of capital
accumulation adds only one state variable, that is, the share of worldwide capital owned by
domestic rms, st.9 By having only two endogenous state variables, it becomes practical to
solve the model numerically using global approximation methods. Appendix D reports the list
of equilibrium conditions and describes the computational procedure.
6 Quantitative analysis
This section studies the quantitative properties of the model. The model is calibrated quarterly.
The discount factor for workers, , and the discount factor for investors, , are set to target an
average yearly interest rate of 1.6 percent and an average yearly return on equity of 7 percent.
In the deterministic steady state the interest rate is equal to 1= 1 and the return on equity is
equal to 1=   1. In the stochastic economy the relations between the intertemporal discount
factors and the average returns are more complex. Therefore, to choose  and  we follow
an iterative procedure where we x the parameters, solve the model, and check whether the
average returns match the targets. The required values are  = 0:996 and  = 0:984. Therefore,
there is a 1 percent dierence between the two discount factors. This is smaller than the equity
premium, 5:4%  4 = 1:35%. The dierence can be attributed to the compensation required
by investors for holding risky equity (risk premium).
9This additional state is necessary because of the adjustment cost in investment. In absence of adjustment
costs, we could also ignore st.
26The utility function takes the form U(c;h) = ln(c)   h1+1==(1 + 1=), where  is the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply. We set the elasticity to 0.75 which is between the micro and
macro estimates. The parameter  is set so that working hours are 0.3 on average.
Next we parameterize the production function. The parameter  is chosen to have a steady
state labor income share of 0.7. Without uncertainty, the fraction of output going to workers
in the form of wages is =.10 Given the values of  and , we choose  so that this fraction
is equal to 0.7. Of course, in the stochastic economy the average labor share is not exactly 0.7
but the dierence is small. Next we set the return to scale for an individual rm to + = 0:9.
Given the value of  we derive  = 0:9   .














This functional form is widely used in the literature (see, for example, Jermann (1998)). The
parameters 1 and 2 are chosen so that in the deterministic steady state Q = 1 and I = K.
This requires 1 =  and 2 =  =(1   ). Therefore, we need to calibrate two parameters,
 and . The rst is the depreciation rate which we set to  = 0:02. The second determines
the sensitivity of the adjustment cost and we set it to  = 0:5.
At this point we are left with the calibration of the shock process. The variable  takes
only two values. In addition to the choice of these two values we have to pin down  p, that is,
the probability with which each country forms pessimistic expectations ( = ) in states with
multiple equilibria. We choose ,  and  p to match three targets: (i) the average leverage (debt
over capital) in the US which we set to 0.5; (ii) the standard deviation of debt-to-output ratio
in the US; (iii) the frequencies of crisis, which we set to 4%.11 The full list of parameter values
are reported in Table 1.
Appendix D describes the computational procedure which is based on the discretization of
the state space. The endogenous states ~ bt and st are each discretized on a grid with eleven
points. Values outside the grids are determined through bi-linear interpolation.
10From the rst order condition of labor, Equation (6), we derive wh=F(z;k;h) = (1   ), which provides
an expression for the labor share. We now use condition (7) to derive an expression for . Taking into account
that in a deterministic steady state m
0 =  and R = 1=, this condition becomes = = 1   . Substituting in
the labor share (1   ), we get the expression reported in the main text.
11Although the three parameters are chosen jointly, we can identify the primary parameter that aects each
of the three targets. The average leverage is mostly determined by the average . The standard deviation of
debt is mostly determined by the dierence between  and . The frequency of crisis is mostly determined by  p.
27Table 1: List of parameters
Discount factor for households/workers,  0.996
Discount factor for entrepreneurs,  0.986
Utility parameter,  16.293
Labor elasticity,  0.750
Production technology,  0.200
Production technology,  0.700
Depreciation rate,  0.020
Capital adjustment parameter,  0.500
Low liquidation value,  0.550
High liquidation value,  0.650
Frequency of low liquidation value,  p 0.200
6.1 Results
Our rst result follows simply by noticing that proposition 4.1 extends to this more general
environment and endogenous credit market disturbances (changes in t and 
t) are perfectly
correlated across countries. Thus, with credit shocks alone, all variables (real and nancial)
are perfectly correlated across countries. Hence a large credit shock can generate very strong
co-movement in real and nancial variables like the ones documented in Section 2.
In presenting additional results we outline four main properties: (i) the asymmetric response
to shocks; (ii) the counter-cyclicality of labor productivity in response to credit shocks; (iii)
the severity of crises that arrive after long periods of credit and macroeconomic booms; (iv)
the importance of credit shocks for the volatility of labor and asset prices.
Asymmetry: Figure 6 plots the impulse responses to a credit expansion and a credit con-
traction. Because of the symmetry, we report only the responses for one country. A credit
expansion is generated starting from the limiting equilibrium in which the economy converges
after a long sequence of draws t = . From this equilibrium we consider a sequence of draws
t =  starting at t = 1. Therefore, a credit expansion is generated by a permanent switch
from  to . Similarly, the impulse responses to a credit contraction are generated starting
from the limiting equilibrium in which the economy converges after a long sequence of draws
t = . Starting at t = 1 the economy experiences a sequence of draws t = .
Two remarks are in order. First, the impulse responses take place in a range of states
that admit multiple equilibria. Therefore, the selected draws of t are possible equilibrium
28outcomes. Second, agents do not know in advance the actual draws of t. Therefore, they take
into account the uncertainty induced by the stochastic distribution of t.
Figure 6: Impulse responses to credit expansions and contractions.
In response to the credit expansion we see a gradual increase in the stock of debt and a
persistent expansion in labor and output. The magnitude of the macroeconomic expansion,
however, is not large at impact. The macroeconomic expansion induced by the credit boom
arises through the following mechanism. At impact the rm becomes unconstrained which
eliminates the labor wedge. In addition to that and after the initial period, there is a second
mechanism. As rms take on more debt, they pay more dividends, increasing the discount
factor m0. Thanks to the lower discounting, rms invest more. At the same time, the higher
29borrowing from rms increases the equilibrium interest rate which in turn increases labor
supply and output. The response to a credit contraction displays a dierent pattern. The
stock of debt declines more quickly and the response of labor, output and investment are much
larger at impact. Therefore, the model generates a strong asymmetry in the responses to credit
expansions and contractions.
The intuition for the asymmetry is best understood starting from a situation in which the
enforcement constraint is not binding. If the constraint gets relaxed, the Lagrange multiplier
cannot fall below zero and the expansionary eect on unemployment is mild (only through
the general equilibrium discussed above). Instead, if the constraints get tighter, the Lagrange
multiplier goes from 0 to being positive and that causes a fall in employment and output
(through Equation (19)). As we discussed in Section 2, this asymmetry is consistent with the
macroeconomic dynamics observed during the period 2005-2010.
Counter-cyclical labor productivity: The last panel of Figure 6 plots the impulse re-
sponses of labor productivity, that is, the ratio between output and hours. As in the previous
gure we see an asymmetry between credit expansions and credit contractions. More im-
portantly, a credit expansion causes a decline in labor productivity while a credit contraction
generates an increase in labor productivity. This is important for capturing the counter-cyclical
dynamics of the US labor productivity during the recent crisis as documented in Section 2.
Credit booms and severity of recessions: Figure 7 plots the impulse responses to credit
expansions that later revert back to the pre-expansion levels. A credit boom is generated as
described above. Starting from an equilibrium to which the economy converges after a long
sequence of t = , we assume that at time 1 the economy experiences a switch to t =  (credit
expansion). The value of  stays at the higher level for several periods and then it reverts back
to  permanently. Again, agents do not fully anticipate these particular draws but they form
expectations based on the conditional distribution. We consider credit booms with duration
of 4 quarters (left panels) and 20 quarters (right panels).
The key nding is that the macroeconomic impact of the credit contraction increases with
the duration of the credit expansion. After a protracted credit boom, the economy accumulates
large leverages. When the credit reversal arrives, the required de-leveraging is more severe.
This forces rms to implement larger hiring cuts and generates a stronger macroeconomic
30Figure 7: Duration of credit expansions and severity of contractions.
contraction. In this way the model captures why recessions that arise after long periods of
nancial expansions tend to be associated with more severe macroeconomic contractions.12
Volatility of labor and asset prices: The rst column of Table 2 reports the standard
deviations of various variables. The statistics are computed after detrending the simulated
series with a band-pass lter that preserves cycles of 1.5-8 years (Baxter and King (1999)).
12A recent paper by Gorton and Ordonez (2011) also generates this feature, although through a dierent
mechanism
31Table 2: Business cycle statistics of key variables from detrended simulated series.
Credit Productivity Both
shocks only shocks only shocks
Standard deviations
Output 0.88 0.76 1.16
Consumption 0.68 0.44 0.77
Labor 1.26 0.26 1.26
Investment 2.27 0.77 2.36
Tobin's q 1.14 0.38 1.18
Stock market value 2.46 0.54 2.45
Interest rate 0.48 0.25 0.48
Return on equity 5.82 0.37 5.82
Expected returns (% annualized)
Interest rate 1.40 1.56 1.40
Return on equity 6.96 5.62 6.96
Equity risk premium 1.56 0.06 1.56
Nonbinding constraints, % 96.44 99.99 96.04
Notes: The standard deviations for the returns on stocks and bonds are cal-
culated on unltered data.
Two properties are especially noticeable. First, the model can generate high volatility of
labor, bringing the model closer to the US data for the crisis where employment fell even more
than output (see Figure 5). The reason is that credit shocks cause, through the Lagrange
multiplier on the enforcement constraints, autonomous movements in employment that, due
to decreasing returns, drive smaller movements in output. Second, credit shocks also generate
a high volatility of asset prices. In particular, the stock market value (equity value of rms)
is almost three times more volatile than output. This can also be seen in the bottom panel of
Figure 6 which plots the impulse responses of the market value of equity to a credit expansion
and contraction. The reason for the high asset price volatility is mainly that credit shocks can
sharply change the stochastic discount factor of investors (see Equation 19) who hold shares
of rms. Hence, large 
uctuations in stock prices emerge in equilibrium. This suggests that
credit shocks can contribute to explaining at least part of the large volatility of stock prices
we have observed during the crisis (see Figure 4).
As a result of the higher volatility of asset prices and of the discount factor of investors,
the model can also generate a non-negligible equity risk-premium.13 This is about 1.56 percent
13We should be careful in dening the equity risk-premium. Since bond holders (workers) have a higher
32yearly. We also observe that the volatility of equity returns is quite high in the model but the
volatility of the interest rate is small.
Productivity shocks: Before closing this section we report, as a benchmark, how the model
performs when we consider standard productivity shocks, alone (second column of Table 2) and
together with credit shocks (third column of Table 2). To add productivity shocks we specify
the production function as yt = zt(Kt + K
t )1 k
th
t, where zt denotes the stochastic level of



























t are assumed to be normally distributed innovations with mean 0, common
standard deviation  and correlation . We then pick standard values for these parameters
and in particular we set z = 0:98,  = 0:006 and  = 0:15. The second column of Table 2
shows that the model with only productivity shocks generates much lower volatilities of hours
and asset prices. It is also worth noting that the enforcement constraint is basically never
binding. Because of this, the labor wedge is (almost) always zero, which explains why labor
and asset prices are not very volatile. The last column of Table 2 shows that the model with
both shocks produces statistics very similar to those generated by the model with only credit
shocks, suggesting that in our set-up credit shocks are the leading source of business cycle

uctuations.
7 Global nancial crisis with heterogeneous labor markets
In Section 2 we pointed out that the dynamics of employment during the recent crisis is dierent
between US and other G7 countries, a fact pointed out by Ohanian (2010). This point is also
illustrated using the idea of the `labor wedge', that is, the dierence between the marginal
rate of substitution in consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor. Formally,
this is dened as Uh(ct;ht)=Uc(ct;ht)   Fh(kt;ht), where Uh and Uc are the marginal utilities
discounting than equity holders (investors), the dierence between the expected return on equity (for investors)
and on bonds (for workers) is not the risk premium. In fact, even in absence of risk, the return on equity will
be higher than the return on bonds. Given the calibration of  = 0:996 and  = 0:986, the return dierential in
absence of risk would be about 4 percent yearly. Given this, we dene the equity risk-premium as the dierence
between the return dierential between equity and bonds and the dierence in discount rates between investors
and workers.
33of leisure and consumption respectively and Fh is the marginal product of labor. With CES








Using this formula, Ohanian and Rao (2011) nd that while in the US the labor wedge
dropped dramatically during the recent crisis, the average wedge in other G7 countries experi-
enced a modest drop. In few countries like Germany it even increased. The goal of this section
is to show that the dierent behavior of the labor market can be reconciled with the view of
a global nancial crisis when the structure of the labor market diers across countries.
In order to show this point we extend our model by adding two elements: variable labor
utilization and heterogeneous labor rigidities. The role of variable labor utilization is to allow
for a more powerful mechanism for endogenous 
uctuations in measured labor productivity.
The role of labor rigidities is to allow for a dierent response of labor utilization and measured
labor input to shocks. By further assuming that labor rigidities dier across countries, the
model can generate heterogeneous responses of macroeconomic and labor market variables.
The assumption of heterogeneous labor rigidities is consistent with anecdotal as well as more
systematic evidence. For example, Ohanian and Rao (2011) refer to indicators from the
OECD Employment Outlook (2008) and report that the US is the country with the most

exible labor market. On the other hand, many of the countries in continental Europe and
Japan are placed at the opposite end of the scale of labor market 
exibility.
Let's start with labor utilization. The production function is specied as F(kt;nt), where
nt is the `eective' input of labor. This results from the combination of (measured) hours, ht,













The parameter % is the elasticity of substitution between hours spent in the workplace and
the actual utilization. When % = 1 we have nt = h0:5
t e0:5
t , which is often used in the literature.
The cost of utilization comes from workers disutility. Given the utility function U(ct;ht+et),
workers face higher disutility not only when they spent more hours in the workplace but also
when their services are utilized more intensively. An implication of this specication is that
the utilization cost is equal to the wage rate wt, and the total cost of labor for the rm is
34(ht + et)wt.
So far the addition of labor utilization is inconsequential for the properties of the model.
Given the CES aggregation and the fact that the wage rate is the price for both ht and et,
rms always choose et = ht. Thus, we can simply focus on ht as in the original model and
abstract from utilization. This equivalence no longer holds once we add labor market rigidities
on working hours ht.
Some authors interpret labor market rigidities as constraining the extensive margin (em-
ployment) rather than the intensive margin (per-worker hours). However, since the model does
not distinguish these margins, we interpret labor market rigidities as restricting total hours ht.
More specically, we assume that rms incur the convex cost
(ht    h)2wt;
where  h is exogenous.
Ideally, we would like to use a more standard adjustment cost, for example something like
(ht   ht 1)2wt. This alternative formulation, however, would introduce an additional state
variable, ht 1, which increases the computational complexity of the model. To avoid this,
we specify the cost as deviation from a xed target. The multiplication by the wage rate
is motivated by economic and technical considerations. From an economic point of view it is
likely that the direct cost of labor, which depends on the wage, also aects the cost of changing
employment. An example is severance payments. From a technical point of view the presence
of the wage allows us to apply the same normalization procedure used in the version of the
model with capital accumulation.
The key parameter is . With a positive value of , the response of utilization et to
shocks is bigger than the response of hours ht. This generates a decline in measured TFP
and, potentially, a decline in measured labor productivity yt=ht. These eects increase with
the value of . Therefore, if in our model the rst country (the US) is characterized by lower
labor market rigidities than the second country (the other G7), the model could generate very
dierent responses of labor markets to a nancial shock.
7.1 Simulation results
We describe here only the calibration of the parameters that need to be re-calibrated or were
not present in the baseline model. We start with the elasticity of substitution between hours
35and utilization, the parameter %, which we set to 5. This value implies a high degree of
substitutability between hours and utilization. The utility parameter  is chosen to have
average working hours of 0.33 in the equilibrium without labor rigidities.
At this point we are left with the parameters  h, 1 for country 1 and 2 for country 2.
Given the values of 1 and 2, we could choose  h to have the desired dierential in average
employment between the two countries. We choose total hours in the US to be 5 percent
higher than in other G7 countries, although this is not very important for the business cycle
properties of the model.
The important parameters are 1 and 2. Unfortunately we are not aware of statistics
that can be used directly to pin down these two parameters. Because of this we take a more
pragmatic approach. We pick the values of 1 = 0:3 and 2 = 1:5 so that the model generates
heterogeneous drops in labor wedges after a negative credit shock similar to the drops observed
during the recent crisis. Of course, the relevance of the exercise is only to show that the model
`could' generate the heterogeneous responses of the labor market observed in the US and in
the G6 countries. In this way we show that the idea of a global nancial crisis as a driver of
the recent recession cannot be written down by the observation of cross-country heterogeneity
in labor market dynamics. However, we understand that this is only suggestive.
Figure 8 plots the impulse responses of several variables to a permanent credit contraction.
The impulse responses are constructed using the same methodology as in Figure 6. As can
be seen from the gure, the responses of investment and output are very similar in the two
countries. However, the responses of hours and the labor wedge are signicantly smaller in
country 2.14 We also observe strong heterogeneity in the response of labor productivity which
falls only slightly in country 1 but experiences a large drop in country 2. Therefore, the
model could replicate the dierent dynamics of the labor market between the US and other
G6 countries even if the dynamics of other macroeconomic variables are similar.
Before closing, we would like to make some remarks about the concept of labor rigidities.
These are typically interpreted as the consequence of institutional factors such as regulations
and union power. Here, instead, we would like to give a broader interpretation. For example,
14In our model, the labor wedge is slightly dierent from Equation (23) because the production function is
not constant returns. Furthermore, there is labor utilization and ct is only the consumption of workers, not
aggregate consumption. However, we measure the labor wedge as if the true model was the standard RBC since
this is the way it has been measured in the literature. After simulating the model and generating the series for
ct, ht and yt, we compute the wedge by plugging the series in Equation (23). The values of the parameters are
the same values used in Ohanian and Rao (2011), that is,  = 0:99,  = 0:36,  = 0:0175, g = 0:005 and  is
chosen so to have steady hours of 0.33.
36Figure 8: Impulse responses to a credit contraction with asymmetric labor markets.
it is well known that labor market rigidities are dierent across sectors. To the extent that in
certain countries the crisis had an impact on sectors with greater labor market 
exibility, we
may observe larger declines in employment and hours. For instance, the construction sector is
typically characterized by greater hiring 
exibility because of its cyclicality. Then, countries
that experience large contractions in the real estate sector are also likely to experience large
drops in employment. This is the case for Spain, a country where the real estate sector
experienced an abnormal boom before the crisis. In this sense, a country like Spain could be
considered a country with a 
exible labor market, simply because the sector with higher labor
market 
exibility was hit hard by the crisis.
378 Conclusion
We have documented that the recent nancial crisis has been characterized by a historically
high degree of international synchronization in real and nancial variables. We have proposed
a theoretical framework in which endogenous credit booms and credit crises can result from
self-fullling expectations. These episodes aect the real sector of the economy through a
credit channel: booms enhance the borrowing capacity of rms and in the general equilibrium
they lead to (mildly) higher employment and production. Crises curtail borrowing capacity
and they lead to sharp contractions in real activity and asset prices.
When countries are nancially integrated, self-fullling credit booms/crises also generate
large spillovers to the real and nancial sectors of other countries. There are two channels
of international transmission. The rst channel is through the cost of capital which in an
integrated nancial market is equalized across countries. The second channel is based on the
endogenous nature of credit market conditions. These conditions change when the economy
switches from one self-fullling equilibrium to another self-fullling equilibrium. But in an
integrated world market the shift in one country can only arise if the shift takes place also
in the other. Therefore, changing nancial market conditions are highly synchronized when
nancial markets are internationally integrated.
This study does not exclude the possibility that other sources of business cycle 
uctuations
also generate international co-movement in real variables. Our interest in changing credit
market conditions as a source of business cycle is motivated by their ability to generate large
cross-country co-movement in the real sector of the economy together with large international
co-movement in the 
ows of nancing and asset prices. As far as the recent crisis is concerned,
we do not claim that a credit shock is the only cause of the crisis. However, we have shown
that a credit shock can go a long way in capturing several features of the crisis and, especially,
its unprecedented international dimension.
38Appendix
A Debt renegotiation
The enforcement constraint is derived from the following assumptions. Default arises at the end of the
period before repaying the intra-temporal loan lt. In case of default the lender can conscate the rm
and sell the physical capital at price t but it cannot conscate the liquidity lt = F(ht).
Dene rst the value of the rm recursively as
Vt(bt) = dt + Etmt+1Vt+1(bt+1);
where mt+1 is the discount factor, taken as given by an individual rm. Since default takes place at the
end of the period, after the dividends, the value of not defaulting is Etmt+1Vt+1(bt+1). We now derive
the value of defaulting.
In the event of default the parties negotiate a repayment t to the lender. If they reach an agreement,
the rm continues operation and its value is Etmt+1Vt+1(bt+1) + lt   t. What this says is that the
rm retains its continuation value Etmt+1Vt+1(bt+1) plus the liquidity net of the bargained payment
t. Without an agreement the rm retains only the divertible liquidity lt (threat value). The net value
of an agreement is the dierence between the value of renegotiation and the threat value, that is,
Etmt+1Vt+1(bt+1)   t: (24)
Let's consider now the lender. With an agreement the lender gets t + bt+1=Rt. The intertemporal
debt is discounted since it will be repaid next period. Without an agreement the lender receives the




  t k: (25)
The net surplus is the sum of the net values for the rm, (24), and the lender, (25), that is,
St(bt+1) = Etmt+1Vt+1(bt+1) +
bt+1
Rt
  t k: (26)
Under the assumption that the rm has all the bargaining power, the value of defaulting is lt+St(bt+1).
Incentive compatibility requires that the value of not defaulting is not smaller than the value of
default, that is
Etmt+1Vt+1(bt+1)  lt + St(bt+1);
Substituting the denition of the net renegotiation surplus St(bt+1), Equation (26) and rearranging
we obtain the enforcement constraint t k = lt +
bt+1
Rt .
39B First order conditions
Consider the optimization problem (3) and let  and  be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
two constraints. Taking derivatives we get:
d : 1    = 0
h : [Fh(h)   w]   Fh(h) = 0







Using the envelope condition Vb(s;b) =  , the rst order conditions can be written as in (6) and (7).
C First order conditions for the model with capital

















Qt = tt + g
 
t E ~ mt+1 ~ Vk(~ st+1;~ kt+1;~ bt+1)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the enforcement constraint and Qt is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the law of motion of capital (Tobin's q). The multiplier associated with the
budget constraint is 1. For the foreign country we have the same conditions with the star superscript.
The envelope conditions are:
~ Vb(~ st;~ kt;~ bt) =  1
















Substituting and imposing the equilibrium conditions kt = Kt and ~ kt = st, we obtain (19)-(22).
D Dynamic system and solution approach
We will use the bar sign to denote aggregate worldwide variables normalized by the worldwide stock of





t  ~ dt + ~ d
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t = ~ ct (28)























































































































































































41Equations (27)-(42) form a dynamic system composed of 16 equations. Given the states t;
t ; bt;st,





t, gt, t, Rt,  dt,  bt+1, st+1. Therefore, we
have a dynamic system of 16 equations in 16 unknowns.
The computational procedure is based on the approximation of four functions:
 1(st+1) =  c
 1
t+1
 2(st+1) =  d
 
t+1










































In addition to these four functions, we need to guess the function p(st+1), that is, the probability
of t+1 = . This is necessary to compute the next period expectation.
The procedure starts with a guess for the values of the approximated functions  1(st+1),  2(st+1),
 3(st+1),  4(st+1). We construct rst a two dimensional grid for the endogenous states  b and s. Then
for each realization of the shocks|t and 
t |we guess the values taken by the above functions over
the grid points. Values outside the grid are obtained through bi-linear interpolation. Next we guess
p(st+1) for each grid point. Once we know the approximated functions and probabilities for t+1, we
can solve for the 16 unknowns of the system (27)-(42) at each grid point and for each possible value
of t and 
t . In nding the solutions we check whether the enforcement constraint is binding (t > 0)
or not binding (t = 0). We then use the solutions found at each grip point to update the guesses for
the four functions  1(st+1),  2(st+1),  3(st+1),  4(st+1) and the probabilities p(st+1). To update these
probabilities we need to check whether multiple equilibria are feasible for all possible states. Eectively
we check this on the grid points of the states. We keep iterating until the guesses for  1(st+1),  2(st+1),
 3(st+1),  4(st+1) and p(st+1), evaluated at the grid points, are equal to the values obtained by solving
the dynamic system (also at the grid points).
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